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The COVID-19 Pandemic as an Opportunity 
for a Permanent Reduction in Civil Rights
Pandemia COVID-19 jako możliwość trwałego ograniczenia praw 
obywatelskich
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has had far-reaching effects, which are primarily being felt in the 
functioning of the health service, the organization of social life, and the state of the national economy. 
It is also worth paying attention to the legal and political consequences which are less obvious and 
noticeable for average citizens. One of the most important is the change in legislation which entails 
limiting civil liberties and rights. This article is on empirical proof of how Polish legislation is reducing 
fundamental rights. The authorities in combatting the pandemic are not using the solutions that appear 
in the Polish Constitution, but use the non-constitutional form of special laws. The authors, therefore, 
when discussing the problem refer to US legislation and policy which has the notable example of 
the Patriot Act which can be interpreted as being a pretext for limiting civil liberties in the name of 
combating terrorism. As stated, such emergencies as the current pandemic or the threat of terrorism, 
are used to permanently and significantly reduce civil rights.
Keywords: the COVID-19 pandemic; fundamental rights; civil liberties; civil rights; US legisla-
tion; Polish legislation
INTRODUCTION
Situations to do with threats to public security often legitimize legislative 
initiatives that strengthen competences of public authorities, and limit the scope 
of exercising civil rights and liberties. Such action is always presented as being 
temporary measures that are necessary to remove a threat and which will be with-
drawn only as soon as the threat disappears. However, the question arises whether 
a situation of crisis that is a threat to the security of an entire society, such as a ter-
rorist attack, a crisis in a financial system, or a pandemic, is not in a democratic 
state taken to be an opportunity to permanently, not only temporarily, strengthen 
the instruments of control that are available to the entities that exercise authority 
over the governed, and also as an opportunity for a permanent, not only temporary 
reduction in the scope of exercising civil rights and freedoms (of various types: 
personal, economic, political, etc.).
The research and analyses presented in this article serve to defend the thesis that 
in recent years such tendencies can be observed in democratic countries. Citizens 
that sense threat and uncertainty that is caused by a situation that poses a threat 
to the very basis of existence, such as a military attack, or a pandemic, agree to 
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a temporary reduction of rights and freedom because they recognize that the actions 
of the authorities will be more effective. Erich Fromm already in Escape from Free-
dom showed that a person is willing to voluntarily submit to enslavement provided 
that it guarantees the person a sense of security.1 An example of such a situation is 
the COVID-19 pandemic which has spread throughout the world in a short time. 
COVID-19 is not only a highly contagious disease that spreads quickly, but above 
all it is very dangerous to the human species. COVID-19 meets the criteria of being 
the top 5th category in the CDC Pandemic Severity Index2 chart and for which the 
mortality rate starts at 2.0%. For COVID-19 it is around 2.1% (as of 2 June 2021).3 
It, therefore, is a global threat to human health and life. The state of this “plague” 
has exposed not only the fragility of our existence, but also the weakness of today’s 
global civilization. After all, today, we are at the stage of shaping a post-modern 
society. The problem was firmly emphasized by Zygmunt Bauman who indicated 
that today we are faced with the dire choice of security or freedom.4
The dangers to maintaining civil rights and freedom that result from situations 
of extraordinary threat are indicated, i.a., by the fact that the solutions under “an-
ti-crisis” laws that limit the right of individuals to exercise rights may not always be 
justified by the need to combat a threat, and also that “extraordinary” solutions can 
be extended even though a threat has already subsided, or is more and more illusory.
Several research methods were used to be able to demonstrate the mentioned 
thesis. The first was an original empirical method of determining long-term trends 
in the process of creating the most important legislation for the country to do with 
how frequently legislators followed specific objectives of legislative policy. The 
second research method was a dogmatic analysis of constitutional and statutory 
regulations and judicature in the USA and Poland in the context of accepting 
solutions in law to counteract threats to public security, with specific emphasis on 
selected solutions in law that appeared in both countries in 2001–2020.
1 E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, New York 2013.
2 Pandemic severity index, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pandemic_severity_index [access: 
6.03.2021].
3 Johns Hopkins University & Medicine. Coronavirus Resource Center, COVID-19 Dashboard 
by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University, https://
coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html [access: 2.06.2021].
4 Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge 2000.
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OPINIONS IN JURISPRUDENCE TO DO WITH THE PROBLEM OF 
ENACTING LAW IN A SITUATION OF THREAT TO PUBLIC SECURITY
The law can be both an instrument to strengthen the control of entities exercis-
ing authority over the actions of individuals that are being governed and a means 
of strengthening the control of individuals over the action of subjects exercising 
authority. Each of those functions of the law has an axiological foundation, but 
each remains, to a large extent, opposite to the other because they often serve to 
strengthen the position of social groups that have separate, or even opposing, in-
terests. In the context of the process of law-making nation-wide, a transition from 
the function of implementing a strengthening of the control of entities in authority 
over the actions of individuals being governed to the function of strengthening the 
control of individuals over the actions of entities in authority, and vice versa, is 
not a socially easy process, or trivial. That which is beneficial for a social group 
wanting to make a change that is desired is a novel and exceptional circumstance 
that will justify the necessity of making the change and which will be so important 
for everyone that it will “gag” opponents. An example of such an occasion is the 
emergence of an extraordinary public health threat of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The pandemic has caused a situation whereby society has voluntarily sacrificed 
freedom for the sake of security. “It’s not surprising that we talk about the virus 
in terms of a war. The emergency provisions effectively force us to live under 
a curfew. But a war against an invisible enemy that can nestle in any other human 
being is the most absurd of wars. It is, to be truthful, a civil war. The enemy isn’t 
somewhere outside, it’s inside us”.5
It is, therefore, no coincidence that the COVID-19 pandemic reveals close links 
between the response of the government to the crisis and the principle of the rule 
of law. At this point, it is worth recalling the constitutive components that make 
up the canon of understanding the rule of law. Those are:
− a public authority is bound and accountable by pre-existing, clear, and known 
law,
− citizens are treated as being equal under the law,
− human rights are protected,
− citizens have access to effective and predictable mechanisms to resolve 
disputes,
− law and public order are common.6
5 M. Foucault, S. Benvenuto, G. Agamben, Coronavirus and Philosophers, “European Journal 
of Psychoanalysis” 2020, www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/coronavirus-and-philosophers [access: 
6.03.2021].
6 T. Bingham, The Rule of Law, London 2011.
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The situation of there being such an extraordinary state enables the authori-
ties to legislate beyond the limits of that which was permitted to date, i.e., to the 
phenomenon referred to as the instrumentalization of the law about which writes 
Ágnes Heller, meaning such an amendment of legal order by the authority (pri-
marily, legislative and executive) that leads to the emergence of authoritarianism.7 
In literature on the subject, there is a two-fold approach to a state of emergency: 
constitutional-legal (normative) and extra-legal (factual).
Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin presented, in flowing suit, five positions 
for emergency situations. Among the constitutional approaches they included: 
necessity as a source for law and necessity as “meta-regulation of constitutional 
construction”. The three remaining non-constitutional ones are: political necessity 
making issues of law irrelevant; necessity as a prerequisite for suspending law, 
but not the creation of novel law; necessity as a justification for unlawful conduct 
without giving it the nature of law, or suspending it.8
Many modern constitutions define emergency measures and situations neces-
sary to their implementation. In situations of specific risk, if ordinary constitutional 
measures were to be insufficient, any of the following appropriate emergency meas-
ures could be implemented: martial law, a state of defense, a state of emergency, 
a state of natural disaster. An emergency occurs as a result of a sudden, rapid, and, 
usually, unexpected situation such as the current pandemic. The situation is a direct 
threat (loss of life, health, material and non-material losses) of global phenomenon. 
Such a state determines the need to provide assistance and take immediate pre-
ventive or corrective action, mainly by public authorities (government). In Poland, 
regulations under a state of emergency have the status of being constitutional or 
are in separate legislation the legitimacy of which is provided in the constitution. 
They are a permanent and indefeasible component of the political system of the 
state (Chapter XI of the Polish Constitution9).
Emergency measures are usually understood to mean a special manner of exer-
cising public authority. They are usually preceded by specific circumstances, e.g., 
natural phenomena, rapid social or political events, armed conflict. That condition 
should be temporary. That applies both to the crisis itself and to how to respond 
to it.10 A distinctive feature of a crisis is that the crisis changes the competence of 
a public authority within the principle of separation and balance of power. The 
7 Á. Heller, Wykłady i seminaria lubelskie, Lublin 2006, pp. 13–28.
8 O. Gross, F. Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis, Cambridge 2006, p. 47.
9 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, no. 78, item 
483, as amended). English translation of the Constitution at: www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/
kon1.htm [access: 10.09.2021].
10 O. Gross, “Once more unto the Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European 
Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, “Yale Journal of International Law” 1998, 
vol. 23(2), p. 459.
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pandemic is an extraordinary phenomenon and, regardless of regulations, it com-
pels that there be specific conduct, e.g., when accessing medical care or medical 
resources. From the aspect of medicine, requires special action which usually means 
discrimination and unequal access to medical care. In such an extraordinary situa-
tion as a pandemic, the basic rule of equality is suspended in favor of one or both 
of the rules of use-ability (utility), or aid to those most in need. The question, here, 
arises whether similar discrimination can be applied outside the area of medical 
assistance in relation to those areas that do not involve an immediate threat to life, 
such as to the economy. It seems that the threat to life and health caused directly by 
a pandemic is a unique type of threat that is disproportionate to other types of threat 
or risk. It, therefore, as such, could justify a rule of discrimination in allocating 
access to medical assistance. But the remaining areas of risk associated with the 
pandemic should not mean change in legislation leading either to discrimination 
or to restrictions of rights or freedom except in situations that are directly related 
to the protection of health and life.
The emergency situations specified in the constitution should not, howsoever, 
infringe upon the principle of the rule of law. Even though constitutional regulations 
sometimes limit basic human and civil rights, the basic task of them, however, is to 
secure the life and health of an entire community. There is no doubt that in a public 
health crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, there is bound to appear that which 
is known as “grey holes” which are an expression of open and unclear concepts.11 
The key problem is not to use emergency measures for purposes other than those for 
which they were designed. Ralf Salam is correct that “a state of emergency poses 
a challenge to democratic constitutional makers to ensure the exercise of authority, 
in particular, by the executive, which facilitates the exercise of strong and effective 
government, while at the same time providing safeguards against abuse”.12
In many countries, public authorities to deal with the pandemic have been given 
specific authority to isolate and quarantine citizens. Such solutions were and are 
even recommended by international organizations.13 Workplaces, kindergartens, 
schools, and universities were closed to contain the spread of the pandemic. The 
state and institutions of its, which are responsible for controlling the phenomenon 
were also deprived of the possibility of functioning normally. Isolation as a means 
of combating a pandemic is a widely accepted solution. However, even though 
international law permits that method of combating a pandemic (as being histori-
cally justified), isolation and quarantine are often abused. Limited testing in Poland 
11 D. Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency, Cambridge 2009.
12 R. Salam, The Relationship Between States of Emergency, Politics and The Rule of Law, 
“Canterbury Law Review” 2017, vol. 23, p. 24.
13 R. Magnusson, Chapter 11: Public Health Emergencies, [in:] Advancing the Right to Health: 
The Vital Role of Law, Geneva 2017, p. 166.
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has caused prolongation of having to stay in isolation or quarantine, until recently, 
was the only measure used to prevent the spread of the virus. Attention should be 
paid to the fact that the pandemic is used to discriminate against specific social 
groups. In Poland, it affects the elderly, the sick, and those having an increased risk 
of infection, persons staying in social welfare centers, and, above all, health care 
workers.14 In many countries, there have been restrictions on the freedom of speech 
and the media has been used to dis-inform the public about an imminent danger.15
In the United States, where the Constitution did not provide the institution of 
states of emergency, their introduction was evolutionary (through the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence). “We the people of the United States, in order to form a more 
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America”16 – the words of the Preamble to the US Constitution reflect Founding 
Fathers’ understanding of the “blessings of liberty” versus “defense” dilemma.
Protecting personal freedoms became more evident with the ratification of 
the Bill of Rights in 1791. Freedom of religion, freedom of expression, the right 
to organize peaceful gatherings (First Amendment), or procedural due process of 
law (Fifth Amendment) have been enshrined in the US Constitution. The Fourth 
Amendment limited the right of the authorities to search and seize: “The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”.
However, in 1798 Congress restricted the exercising of civil rights by passing 
the Alien Sedition Act.17 To protect the security of the newly established republic 
congressmen approved a law that made a false critique of the government and gov-
ernment officials a federal crime. John Adams’s administration used that law, aiming 
at securing national unity, to prosecute political opponents. It took the Supreme 
Court more than 150 years to declare the Alien Sedition Act to be unconstitution-
al, even though as early as in December 1798 the future President John Adams 
presented a resolution of the delegates of Virginia firmly condemning the act and 
foreseeing the consequences of an authority unbalanced in intimidating individual 
14 United Nations Department of Global Communications, UN working to ensure vulnerable 
groups not left behind in COVID-19 response, www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/
un-working-ensure-vulnerable-groups-not-left-behind-covid-19 [access: 6.03.2021].
15 S. Svensson, Disinformation kills: The Covid-19 infodemic, 29.04.2020, https://observatoryihr.
org/blog/disinformation-kills-the-covid-19-infodemic [access: 6.03.2021].
16 Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis, and Interpretation – Centennial Edi-
tion – Interim, S. Doc. 112-9, August 26, 2017.
17 Alien Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
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rights: “[…] the General Assembly doth particularly PROTEST against the palpable 
and alarming infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of the ‘Alien and 
Sedition Acts’, passed at the last session of Congress; the first of which exercises 
a power nowhere delegated to the federal government, and which, by uniting leg-
islative and judicial powers to those of executive, subverts the general principles 
of free government, as well as the particular organization and positive provisions 
of the Federal Constitution; and the other of which acts exercises, in like manner, 
a power not delegated by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and pos-
itively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto, – a power which, more than 
any other, ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right 
of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication 
among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual 
guardian of every other right”.18
During turbulent times the United States often resorted to emergency law 
to limit the scope of individual liberty. Bruce Ackerman provides a list of such 
infringements used in the past; viz, “curfews, evacuations, compulsory medical 
treatment, border controls; authority to search and seize suspicious materials and 
to engage in intensive surveillance and data compilation; freezing financial as-
sets and closing otherwise lawful businesses; increasing federal control over state 
governments, expanding the domestic role of the military, and imposing special 
limitations on the right to bear arms”.19
The experience of the use of emergency laws proves that breaching 
a checks-and-balances system is not limited to the executive-legislative branch 
struggle, but affects the judicial branch of the government as well. World War I and 
later the “red scare” resulted in two important cases. In Schenck v. United States 
the Supreme Court upheld a penalty of ten years’ imprisonment for distributing 
rather harmless pamphlets and, thereby, permitted limiting the freedom of speech.20 
During the McCarthy era, in Dennis v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld 
imprisonment under the Smith Act of 194021 of a group from the Communist Party 
USA that had organized themselves to study works of Marx, Lenin, and Engels 
and, thereby, the Supreme Court denied the group the right to exercise freedom 
of speech.22 Even though it was not, as Erwin Chemerinsky claims in his paper, 
that Chief Justice Red Vincent in an opinion for the court wrote: “[…] when the 
18 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Con-
stitution, vol. 4: Virginia Resolutions of 1798, Washington 1836, pp. 528–529.
19 B. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, New 
Haven 2006, p. 96; P. Laidler, How Republicans and Democrats Strengthen Secret Surveillance in 
the United States, “Political Preferences” 2019, vol. 25, pp. 5–20.
20 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21 Smith Act of 1940, Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
22 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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evil is so great as to overthrow the United States government, there doesn’t need 
to be any proof of increase in likelihood”,23 the Supreme Court decided that the 
communist party by merely attempting to organize the study group “created a ‘clear 
and present danger’ of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and vi-
olence”.24 Protecting the right to privacy, to a fair trial and, to a lesser extent, the 
right to freedom of expression in the United States was significantly eroded after 
the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, which is discussed in more detail in 
the latter part of this article.
RESEARCH
1. Method of research
The research project, the results of which are discussed in this article, was based 
on a unique, innovative method of study of Polish legislation from 1990 onwards. 
The method is qualitative and quantitative in nature. It is based on the assumption 
that the creation of generally binding law shows long-term tendencies, as it is subject 
to the law of supply and demand, just as is the production of any other tangible or 
intangible goods in society. The tendencies are manifested in a periodic increase 
or periodic reduction of the involvement of the legislator in creating legislation 
that refers to specific social, economic, and political reasons for creating the law 
(i.e., so-termed material sources of law). In the project, the starting point was the 
formulation of partial research questions (research issues) based on theoretical 
assumptions about the occurrence of basic economic, social and political reasons 
(factors) determining the creation of specific legislation. The questions were used 
to assess whether the reasons for drafting the legislation being analyzed were the 
factors that have been mentioned, and to what extent and how often. An assess-
ment of the occurrence of a factor (assessment) was made in accordance with the 
importance of the factor in creating the legislation. The data obtained in that way 
was aggregated into time-number sequences (time series), with the standard unit 
of time being one year.
The last tranche of research is a certain exception to the mentioned assumptions 
because it only applies to the middle of a year, i.e., the period January–June 2020. 
That period has almost all the regulations adopted by the Polish parliament to coun-
teract the COVID-19 pandemic and to combating the social-economic effects of it.
23 E. Chemerinsky, Post 9/11 Civil Rights: Are Americans Sacrificing Freedom for Security?, 
“Denver University Law Review” 2004, vol. 81(4), p. 761.
24 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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An assessment of the occurrence of specific reasons for the creation of a specific 
act is made on the basis of aggregating data on the course of the legislative process 
that was obtained from sources such as the justifications of draft legislation, opin-
ions of experts (e.g., employees of the Polish Sejm Analysis Bureau), opinions of 
entities consulted in the legislative process (e.g., opinions of the Polish Supreme 
Court, positions of trade unions, opinions of employer organizations, etc.), records 
of the course of discussions at plenary sessions of the Sejm and Senate of the Re-
public of Poland, parliamentary and senate committees, etc.
The process of an assessment consisted in assessing each act, from the aspect 
of the partial research questions, in accordance with seven possible types of as-
sessment. For each of the questions (research issues) formulated in relation to each 
of the acts one of the following values was given: –3, –2, –1, 0, 1, 2, 3. To note is 
that the assessments that were given were in accordance with a seven-point ordinal 
scale (similar to the five-point Likert scale that is considered in social sciences).25 
The point was to emphasize clear differences in socio-economic and political im-
portance between specific regulations (e.g., between a novel codification and an 
amendment to a single provision). Providing a value depended on the degree of 
convergence with the regulatory effect that was assumed in the research question 
(issue): from “3” (strong, significant connection with the research issue, the pur-
pose of legislation coincides with the direction assumed in the research question), 
to “–3” (strong, significant connection with the research issue, the purpose of the 
legislation is opposite to the direction assumed in the research question), and the 
value of “0” (meaning no reference to the issue under research).
The sequences of annual distributions of cumulative assessments obtained for 
each of the questions were the basis for creating appropriate time series that were 
subject to further analysis: each of the time series that was created should be under-
stood to be a series of annual measures (synthetic measures) featuring the chosen 
properties of the distributions of aggregate assessments. The created series were 
divided into two types: a series of absolute values, which reflect the total number 
of assessed acts in specific years (type “counting”) and, for a change, a series of 
relative values, i.e., those which did not reflect the number of acts in subsequent 
years (type “frequency”). In brief, the type “counting” portrays the legislator’s 
overall commitment to the creation of law relevant to a given research issue, while 
the type “frequency” gives a better idea of how much – in that total number – there 
was draft legislation of great social, economic, or political importance.
For questions for which the annual cumulative assessments are in the vast ma-
jority the same in terms of value, the important measures are those that distinguish 
–3 and –2 (or only –3) from the others, or, to the contrary, distinguish values 2 and 3 
25 R. Likert, A technique for the measurement of attitudes, “Archives of Psychology” 1932, 
vol. 140, pp. 5–55.
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(or only 3) from other assessments. That approach leads to a group of working 
measures termed “cut down” or, correspondingly, “cut up”. In brief, figuratively, 
the measures permit assessing the action of the legislator that is solely intended to 
achieve a legislative goal that coincides with the direction assumed in the research 
question, or the action of the legislator solely intended to achieve a legislative goal 
opposite to the direction assumed in the research question.
Finally, it is worth noting that the number of assessed acts, enacted in the first 
half of 2020, is significantly lower than those in corresponding periods in previous 
years. From around 2000, a typical figure is the enacting of about 80–100 statutes 
in one 6-month period. Assessments in the first half of 2020 were only of 53 acts. 
This is very significant information in the context of some of the research results 
that is discussed below.26
2. Research results
The results of the Polish legislator’s activity in the first half of 2020 partial-
ly confirm a number of theses that could be formulated intuitively on the ba-
sis of general knowledge about the goals of legislative policy at the time of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. However, some research results were quite surprising, and 
even disturbing, in the context of the values to be cultivated through democratic 
rule of law. In the presentation of research data that follows the research results 
that are first discussed are those that can be taken to confirm the goals of legislative 
policy implementation that were declared by the ruling coalition, and then those 
the results of which can be interpreted to be the change, that was mentioned, in 
the implementation of the functioning of the law that was made for the benefit of 
entities dominant in society (politically and economically).
The assessed research issue was to do with determining whether the goal of 
legislative policy was to strengthen the sense of security in business transactions, 
to reduce the risk of failure in business (e.g., as a result of random factors or as 
a result of competition), or to create more favourable conditions for assessing the 
chances of achieving assumed economic goals (whether it was about increasing 
the predictability of the result of business). Negative assessments were justified in 
a situation when a regulation led to a reduction in the predictability of a business 
venture, or an increase in the risk of business failure. That issue relates to one of the 
key declared goals of legislative policy which was to reduce the risk of operating 
a business during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ruling coalition prepared a number 
26 For a broader discussion of the research method, see P. Chmielnicki, A. Dybała, M. Stachura, 
Activity Rules of Economic Man in Society as the Source of Legal Norms, Warsaw 2010, pp. 143–159, 
174–184.
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of solutions that were intended to counter the effects of “freezing” the economy 
and the fleeing of customers.
Figure 1. Regulations reducing business risk. Type, counting
Source: own elaboration.
In the basic type of compilation of data taking, when considering only a general 
level of legislator involvement in creating acts relevant to the research issue, it is 
not possible to observe a lack of increase in involvement for the type “frequency”, 
when considering not only the “quantity” of legislative work, but also the “quality”, 
i.e., the socio-economic importance of individual legislative initiatives. In 2020, 
there was a very clear increase in involvement in creating law reducing risk to 
business persons.
Figure 2. Regulations reducing business risk. Type, frequency
Source: own elaboration.
The results of the research, therefore, correspond, from one side, to the specific 
nature of the period being analyzed (a minor overall number of acts enacted in the 
first half of 2020), and, from another side, to the knowledge of the main goals of the 
legislative policy in the period being analyzed. The same is true for the next issue.
It is to do with determining whether the reason for creating the regulation is the 
intention to increase – broadly understood – the costs of functioning of the state (in 
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particular, activities related to increased expenditure from the state budget, or the 
budget of a local unit of government). Of course, negative assessments are justified 
in a situation when regulation was intended to reduce the costs of functioning in 
the public sphere.
Figure 3. Regulations generating an increase in public spending. Type, counting
Source: own elaboration.
Draft legislation implemented in connection with the pandemic, described in 
propaganda as “shields”, includes a very significant increase in public spending for 
purposes to do with counteracting the effects of the pandemic. That was the second 
goal of legislative policy that was extensively publicized by the Polish Coalition 
of a United Right. It is as could have been expected intuitively; both types of 
compilation of data actually show a clear upward trend that appears in 2020, and 
the scale of the phenomenon is evidenced by the course of the type “frequency” 
which shows that the legislator involvement in the creation of laws on increasing 
public expenditure reached a level that was a 30-year record!
Figure 4. Regulations generating an increase in public spending. Type, frequency
Source: own elaboration.
The question arises, however, who was to benefit from the expenditure. That 
problem is related to another research issue the subject of which is to determine 
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whether the goal of legislative policy was to redistribute (allocate) goods (mate-
rial or non-material benefit) solely on the basis of compensation for belonging to 
a community. This issue relates primarily to the implementation of the so-termed 
redistributive function of the state, i.e., the distribution of some of the goods gener-
ated/acquired within the state (as part of the distribution of national income), e.g., 
as a so-termed transfer of benefits.
Negative assessments are justified in a situation when the purpose of the act is 
to collect benefits in kind, financial or provided in the form of services to a benefi-
ciary who received them as an entitlement (privilege) because of having a required 
status (e.g., the abolition of the possibility of some categories of pensioners to 
receive free drugs).
Figure 5. Regulations realizing the function of redistribution. Type, counting
Source: own elaboration.
Figure 6. Regulations realizing the function of redistribution. Type, frequency
Source: own elaboration.
It happens to be that the increase in public spending generated by anti-COVID-19 
laws was not intended to implement the function of redistribution (increasing the vol-
ume of transferring benefits). We draw attention to the fact that the involvement of the 
legislator in creating regulations aimed at achieving that goal of legislative policy even 
decreased in comparison to 2019 when, before the parliamentary elections, a number 
of legislative initiatives were adopted to increase the volume of social transfers.
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The research results presented so far correspond, essentially, to the intuitive 
(common) understanding of the direction of legislative work undertaken because of 
the threat from the COVID-19 pandemic. Subsequent results reveal a less obvious 
profile of decisions by legislators. Specifically alarming is the data obtained from 
assessing acts in the context of the issue of whether the reason for creating the 
regulation was the intention to formally strengthen (extend) the protection of the 
rights, which are respected in a democratic state, of subjects that have a relatively 
low economic or political (“dominated”) possibilities. Put differently, the subject 
of the research was the problem of whether a regulation serves to protect civil or 
labour rights, to strengthen the means of citizens to control political authority, or 
to protect the rights of consumers against business persons having a dominant 
position on the market, etc.
Negative assessments are justified, here, in a situation when a regulation is 
to reduce (formally) the rights of “dominated” subjects in relation to “dominant” 
entities, e.g., it reduces access to information about the actions of the authorities, 
reduces the rights of employees, consumers, etc.
Figure 7. Regulations strengthening rights of subjects. Type, frequency
Source: own elaboration.
The slight upward trend that had been maintained for several years was suddenly 
broken in the first half of 2020. Even if the data for 2020 is only for six months, 
the direction that has been described is definitely unfavorable from the aspect of 
a democratic state of law. Of course, the rationale behind the practice is well-known, 
which is that a temporary restriction of civil rights is justified by the need to take 
extraordinary measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. An analysis of the 
documentation of individual legislative initiatives shows, however, that the neces-
sity to introduce some solutions causes controversy. Some examples appear below.
The Act of 2 March 2020 on special solutions to prevent, counteract, and com-
bat COVID-19, other infectious diseases, and the crises caused by them27 includes 
27 Journal of Laws 2020, item 374.
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a solution by which public authorities are not to be liable for the harm caused by 
the authorities in performing public tasks related to counteracting COVID-19. 
The parliamentary opposition protested against that provision in very blunt terms 
and argued, i.a., that the bill is actually an introduction of martial law, that in the 
bill it is expressly provided that the State Treasury, units of local government, and 
state organizational units, are not to be liable for harm caused in connection with 
justified action and so, for example, they could demolish a house for a hospital and 
the State Treasury would not be responsible for that.28
The Act of 31 March 2020 amending the Act on the system of development 
of institutions29 introduced the possibility of transferring all personal data to PFR 
from the Ministry of Finance and KAS, e.g., data from tax returns that was to date 
a fiscal secret. That also applied to data from other state organizational units and 
public authorities which includes that to which applied the law of secrecy (Article 
21ab of the Act). There is doubt about the need for such a far-reaching deviation 
from protecting the data of citizens.
The purpose of the Act of 6 April 2020 on specific rules for holding general 
elections for the presidency of the Republic of Poland that were scheduled for 
202030 was to establish that a method of correspondence was to be the only form 
of participating in the elections. That regulation, which was ultimately not imple-
mented, although being in force for some time, was heavily criticized because of 
the risk of electoral irregularity and fraud in conditions of weakened social control 
over the course of voting.
The Act of 19 June 2020 on interest subsidies on bank loans granted to business 
persons affected by COVID-19, and on simplification of proceedings to approve 
an arrangement because of the occurrence of COVID-1931 introduced very unfa-
vorable solutions for employees. Experts employed in the Sejm of the Republic of 
Poland indicated that a reduction in working hours, or inclusion of an employee 
in budgetary downtime by an employer that experiences a decrease in revenues 
from the sale of goods or services as a result of COVID-19 which, thereby, results 
in a significant increase in the burden on the wage fund is permitted upon a 5% 
increase in the burden on the wage fund. Such a significant increase is to justify 
reducing the working time and remuneration by a maximum of 20% or to have it 
be included in budgetary downtime with a reduction in pay by no more than 50%. 
It is, therefore, disputable whether the restriction of employee rights is proportion-
28 Statement of MP Katarzyna Lubnauer, record of the session of the Health Committee of the 
Sejm of the Republic of Poland (no. 13) of 2 March 2020, www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/biuletyn.
xsp?skrnr=ZDR-13 [access: 6.03.2021].
29 Journal of Laws 2020, item 569.
30 Journal of Laws 2020, item 827.
31 Journal of Laws 2020, item 1086.
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ate to the situation of an employer. The draft significantly worsens the situation 
of employees in a difficult situation of termination of employment and introduces 
novel mechanisms into civil law the effect of which is difficult to predict.32
Experts also indicate a controversial change to the criminal law. There is the 
opinion that the enacted amendments to the Penal Code infringe the constitutional 
principle of equality before the law, the principle of proportionality, the necessity 
and usefulness of tightening penal repression, the right to defend, the principle of 
defining the features activity that are prohibited under the sanction of a penalty, the 
principle of good legislation, the principle of a citizen having trust in the state, the 
principle of predictability of repressive provisions to do with a specific vacatio legis, 
give privileges to perpetrators of more serious acts in relation to the legal situation 
of perpetrators who commit acts less socially harmful and give rise to unfair and 
grossly inconsistent consequences in terms of penalties, which breach Article 31 
(3), Article 32 (1), and Article 42 (1) and (3) in conjunction with Article 2 of the 
Polish Constitution.33
Knowledge about the adoption of such solutions makes the course of the graph 
in Figure 8 understandable. The value of only negative assessments concerning 
the protection of the rights of subjects (i.e., the level of legislator involvement in 
creating laws reducing civil rights and freedom) has reached a shameful record over 
a 30-year period, precisely in 2020, and the number of adopted acts is significantly 
lower than in corresponding periods of previous years.
Figure 8. Regulations strengthening rights. Type, frequency, expected value reduced down by –1
Source: own elaboration.
The results of research on issues related to economic activity complete a por-
trayal of the situation. They indicate that the objectives of legislative policy favour 
those that have an economic advantage over the rest of society (business persons, 
employers). One of them was to do with determining whether the purpose of the 
32 Government bill on interest subsidies for bank loans to provide financial liquidity to business 
affected by COVID-19 and on amendments to certain other acts (Print no. 382 and 382-A), 2020, 
www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=382 [access: 6.03.2021].
33 Ibidem.
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regulation was to introduce novel burdens (novel transaction costs), or to impede 
business persons from achieving a business goal (new “entry barriers”). Negative 
assessments in this matter are justified when the goal of the legislative policy is 
the opposite, i.e., reducing the burden/obstacles to a business person achieving 
a business goal (a reduction of transaction costs or lowering entry barriers).
The graph in Figure 9 indicates a very strong commitment of the legislator in 
2020 that was intended, precisely, to reduce transaction costs or lower entry barriers 
for business persons. The joint interpretation of the results of that and the previous-
ly discussed research issue lead to the conclusion that the Polish legislator in the 
COVID-19 pandemic took care of the interests of employers/business persons at 
the expense of the interests of “ordinary” citizens. However, that portrayal would 
be incomplete if attention is not paid to which business persons did the legislator 
create to be beneficiaries of novel legislative solutions.
Figure 9. Regulations increasing burdens on business persons. Type, frequency
Source: own elaboration.
The research results indicate that the actions of the Polish legislator after the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic were largely driven by the concern to main-
tain a healthy economy. Ordinary citizens were beneficiaries of the activities to 
a much lesser extent. Even more, there are a number of solutions limiting civil and 
labour rights that are difficult to justify by giving the reason that they are meant 
to combat the pandemic.
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DOGMATIC ANALYSIS OF LEGAL REGULATIONS AND 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCEPTING SOLUTIONS THAT 
COUNTERACT THREATS TO PUBLIC SECURITY – SELECTED LEGAL 
SOLUTIONS IN THE USA AND POLAND IN 2001–2020
The research results that have been presented indicate a behaviour of the Polish 
legislator during the COVID-19 pandemic that is disturbing, under the standards 
of a democratic state ruled by law, and which behaviour is moving to reduce civil 
rights and liberties beyond the needs resulting from combating the pandemic. The 
question arises whether citizens can rely on the effects of the legislative action 
being temporary or whether they will have a permanent effect on the Polish legal 
system. To be able to answer the question, it is worth comparing the legislative 
effect of other emergency situations in Poland to those in other countries. Very 
interesting conclusions can be drawn, among others, from the history of the action 
of US authorities aimed at combating terrorism after 11 September 2001.
In jurisprudence, it is claimed that in a democratic state ruled by law the con-
stitution designates all the rules and is the basis for the functioning of the state. 
Each item of legislation that functions in legal circulation is subordinated to the 
constitution. It is that which sets the axiological foundation of the life of a political 
community.34 Constitutionalism is the dominant model of normative regulation of 
the sphere of politics35 because a constitution does not only define the framework 
of activities of state authorities, but also defines a set of professed values and po-
litical goals. That act ensures the stability of an entire system; it defines the rules 
of the political game between subjects in authority and organizes mutual relations 
between them. The law in a constitution restricts sovereign rule. Holders of political 
authority must themselves be ruled by law.36 That is done by:
− determining the formal properties of the law itself and creating numerous 
procedural guarantees regarding the creation and application of it for which 
the state determines the limits of the use of sanctions and state coercion,
34 R. Alexy, La doble naturaleza del derecho, Madrid 2016.
35 Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, ed. L.A. Alexander, Cambridge 2001; L.A. Al-
exander, Constitutionalism, [in:] The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, eds. 
M.P. Golding, W.A. Edmundson, Oxford 2008, pp. 248–258; N. Devins, L. Fisher, The Democratic 
Constitution, Oxford 2004; H. Dippel, Modern Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a History in 
the Need of Writing, “Legal History Review” 2005, vol. 73, pp. 153–170; The Paradox of Constitu-
tionalism. Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, eds. M. Loughlin, N. Walker, Oxford 2007; 
G. Pino, Il costituzionalismo dei diritti. Struttura e limiti del costituzionalismo contemporaneo, 
Bologna 2017; A. Barbera, Le basi filosofiche del costituzionalismo, Bari–Roma 2019.
36 M. Krygier, Four Puzzles about the Rule of Law: Why, what, where? And who cares?, 
“Sant’Anna Legal Studies” 2015, vol. 5, p. 20.
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− determination of the axiological properties of law, which include: the “in-
ternal morality of law” as defined by Lon L. Fuller37; Herbert L.A. Hart’s 
rule of recognition and the thesis about the minimum morality of the law;38 
Gustaw Radbruch’s formula Lex iniustissima non est lex, which opens the 
way to moral values in judicial decisions;39 Robert Alexy’s a non-positivist 
understanding of law, whereby next to the real dimension related to, e.g., the 
act of decision-making, coercion or effectiveness, there is an “ideal element” 
(values contained in a constitution),40
− institutionalization of a specific dualism of law, a dualism that balances 
law as an instrument of governing by law, wherefrom one aspect there are 
spheres excluded from interference by an authority, or at least deprived of 
the possibility of easily or arbitrarily changing it (this applies to the consti-
tution and fundamental rights, “eternal law”),41 and at the same time the law 
created and applied is subject to judicial or tribunal control;
− unequivocal constitutional regulations permitting restrictions on civil rights 
and freedoms during a state of emergency, which must be restrictive and 
clearly defined.42
Theoretically, under the assumption of the double nature of the law and moral 
correction of it, one can counteract phenomena that threaten individual and col-
lective security. Contemporary constitutionalism should be an effective means 
of securing against (to use the term of G. Radbruch) “statutory lawlessness”. Do 
modern constitutions in fact fulfill such a role?
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, it became clear not only to 
the George W. Bush administration, but to society as a whole, that the United 
States must start a “War on Terror” (also known as “Global War on Terrorism”). 
On 20 September, President G.W. Bush stated before the Congress: “Our enemy 
is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our 
war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. […] 
37 L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, New Haven–London 1969.
38 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961.
39 G. Radbruch, Gesetzliches. Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, “Süddeutsche Juristen-
Zaitung” 1946, vol. 1, pp. 105–108.
40 R. Alexy, op. cit., pp. 73–83.
41 G. Palombella, The Rule of Law as Institutional Ideal, “Comparative Sociology” 2010, 
vol. 9(1), pp. 4–39.
42 K. Dobrzeniecki, Prawo wobec sytuacji nadzwyczajnej. Między legalizmem a koniecznością, 
Toruń 2018.
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Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other 
we have ever seen. It may”.43
In the weeks after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
the US Congress adopted several changes to existing regulations relating to na-
tional security. The USA Patriot Act of 200144 went through Congress with almost 
unprecedented,45 ubiquitous support from both the republican and the democratic 
parties. Even on such a rare occasion of national unity, there were some voices 
criticizing the Patriot Act as the departure from the long tradition of protecting 
individual liberty and the right to privacy.46 This has led to significant facilitation 
in eavesdropping on persons suspected of terrorism or supporting such activity, 
or in collecting information about such persons. One such investigative tool is the 
National Security Letter (NSL) used “to obtain subscriber information from third 
parties such as telephone companies, Internet service providers, financial service 
providers, and credit institutions”.47
Ironically, NSLs are rooted in the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197848 that 
aims to protect “customers of financial institutions from unwarranted intrusion into 
their records while at the same time permitting legitimate law enforcement activ-
ity”. The adoption of this law was a congressional response to the Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. Miller.49 But the original intent to protect individuals 
was changed by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 198650 which fur-
ther extended the types of information that could be gathered through NSLs. An 
NSL prohibits a third party from revealing to anyone that such a request was made 
(a so-termed “gag order”)51 to protect the secrecy of the operation.
The USA Patriot Act of 2001, as Brett Weinstein observed, “bolstered the gov-
ernment’s ability to use NSLs to demand information by weakening the requirement 
43 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, https://georgewbush-white-
house.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/text/20010920-8.html [access: 6.03.2021].
44 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
45 147 Cong. Rec. 7224 (2001); 147 Cong. Rec. 11059 (2001).
46 R. Rybkowski, Dyskurs strachu. Jak się nie bać współczesnych mediów?, “Horyzonty Wy-
chowania” 2011, vol. 10(19), pp. 43–57; R. Wyden, C. Guthrie, J. Dickas, A. Perkins, Law and Policy 
Efforts to Balance Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 America, “Stanford Law and 
Policy Review” 2006, vol. 17(329), pp. 331–352.
47 H. Bloch-Wehba, Process Without Procedure: National Security Letters and First Amendment 
Rights, “Suffolk University Law Review” 2016, vol. 39(3), p. 369.
48 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630, 92 
Stat. 3641.
49 House of Representatives Report 95-1383 (1986).
50 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
51 J.M. Zitter, Annotation, Constitutionality of National Security Letters Issued Pursuant to 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2709, (2008), 25 A.L.R. FED. 2d 547.
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for individualized suspicion and increasing the number of agents who can certify 
the need for an NSL. As a result, the use of NSLs has since skyrocketed”.52 Andrew 
E. Nieland noted that the novel law “eliminated the requirement of ‘articulable 
facts’ showing a connection to a foreign power. As a result, an FBI agent could […] 
issue an NSL upon internal certification that the information sought is relevant to 
an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities”.53
The administration did, when drafting the Patriot Act, indicate the need to 
change the law which was compelled by technological progress access to which is 
available to persons involved in terrorist activities. As it was then explained: “Ter-
rorist organizations have increasingly used technology to facilitate their criminal 
acts and hide their communications from law enforcement. Intelligence-gather-
ing laws that were written for an era of landline telephone communications are 
ill-adapted for use in communications over multiple cell phones and computer 
networks, communications that are also carried by multiple telecommunications 
providers located in different jurisdictions. Terrorists are trained to change cell 
phones frequently, to route e-mail through different Internet computers in order 
to defeat surveillance. Our proposal creates a more efficient, technology-neutral 
standard for intelligence gathering, ensuring law enforcement’s ability to trace the 
communications of terrorists over cell phones, computer networks and the new 
technologies that may be developed in the years ahead”.54
But in the 21st century, when more and more advanced mobile phones are used 
not only for the purposes of conversation, or sending SMSs, but also as maps, pri-
mary devices to follow social media, or to monitor physical exercises “toll-billing 
records can reveal friendships and intimate relationships and religious beliefs, 
political associations, or reporter-source relationships”.55
The extensive use of NSLs by federal agencies caught the attention of the pub-
lic in the two court cases Doe v. Ashcroft, vacated and remanded sub nom. Doe v. 
Gonzales. In the first case, an anonymous Internet service provider (ISP), supported 
by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), claimed that the NSL that was 
received breached the plaintiff’s rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amend-
ment. The court ruled that the Fourth Amendment was breached and “the crux of 
the problem is that the form of an NSL, such as the one issued in this case, which 
is preceded by a personal call from an FBI agent, is framed in imposing language 
52 B. Weinstein, Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters, “Wash-
ington University Journal of Law & Policy” 2015, vol. 47, pp. 217–263.
53 A.E. Nieland, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, “Cornell Law Review” 
2007, vol. 92(6), p. 1211.
54 Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act, Serial no. 39, 2001, Washington 2001, p. 6.
55 H. Bloch-Wehba, op. cit., p. 381; Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
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on FBI letterhead and which, citing the authorizing statute, orders a combination 
of disclosure in person and in complete secrecy, essentially coerces a reasonable 
recipient into immediate compliance”.56
The second of the cases was even more informative, not only because it led 
to changes in the Patriot Act and procedures of issuing NSLs, but also because it 
proved that secrecy of the FBI’s operation was dubious. In Doe v. Gonzales the 
plaintiffs, once again represented by the ACLU, filed a suit claiming that NSLs 
based on 18 U.S.C. § 2709 “violate the First Amendment by prohibiting any per-
son from disclosing that the FBI has sought or obtained information with an NSL; 
second, that § 2709 violates the First Amendment by authorizing the FBI to order 
disclosure of constitutionally protected information without tailoring its demand 
to a demonstrably compelling need; third, that § 2709 violates the First and Fourth 
Amendments because it fails to provide for or specify a mechanism by which 
a recipient can challenge the NSL’s validity; fourth, that § 2709 violates the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments by authorizing the FBI to demand disclosure of 
constitutionally protected information without prior notice to individuals whose 
information is disclosed and without requiring that the FBI justify that denial of 
notice on a case-by-case basis; and fifth, that § 2709 violates the Fifth Amendment 
because it is unconstitutionally vague”.57
Judge Janet Hall reasoned in the opinion that “considering the current national 
interest in and the important issues surrounding the debate on renewal of the Patriot 
Act provisions, it is apparent to this court that the loss of Doe’s ability to speak 
out now on the subject as an NSL recipient is a real and present loss of its First 
Amendment right to free speech that cannot be remedied”.58 The Appellate Court 
later dismissed the case because in the meantime the reauthorization of the Patriot 
Act made the case moot. Also, in the meantime the case was no longer secret be-
cause on 2 September 2005 the “New York Times” published the article Hartford 
Libraries Watch as US Makes Demands, correctly indicating that the “John Doe” 
of the case was the Library Connection of Windsor, Connecticut.59
But even the reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 200560 did not end the con-
troversy surrounding the extensive use of NSLs and several more important court 
cases were to discuss the security-liberty balance, or the extent to which the quest 
for national security could limit the constitutional rights guaranteed by the First, 
56 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
57 Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005).
58 Ibidem.
59 A. Leigh Cowan, Hartford Libraries Watch as U.S. Makes Demands, 2.09.2005, www.nytimes.
com/2005/09/02/nyregion/hartford-libraries-watch-as-us-makes-demands.html [access: 6.03.2021].
60 USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Publ. L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192.
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Fourth and Fifth Amendments.61 In 2006, in Gonzales v. Google, Inc., the govern-
ment wanted Google to disclose a substantial number of user online searches, but 
Google argued that complying with the demand would cause the loss of user’s trust 
because Google’s success was “attributed in a large part to the volume of its users 
and these users may be attracted to its search engine because of the privacy and 
anonymity of the service”. The District Court of Northern District of California, 
eventually granted “the Government’s motion to compel only as to the sample of 
50,000 URLs from Google’s search index”.62 Judge James Ware proved to have 
a good understanding of use of the Internet use when providing reasons for the 
limitation: “[…] while a user’s search query reading ‘[user name] stanford glee 
club’ may not raise serious privacy concerns, a user’s search for ‘[user name] third 
trimester abortion san jose’ could raise certain privacy issues as of yet unaddressed 
by the parties’ papers”.63
In 2010, the Sixth Circuit Court in United States v. Warshak ruled that even a de-
fendant that has been convicted should enjoy the privacy of e-mails and, therefore, 
government agents breached the Fourth Amendment by ordering ISP to disclose 
the e-mails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.64 In 2012, 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones decided that attaching a GPS device 
to a motor vehicle is a search under the Fourth Amendment and Justice Sotomayor 
observed that the mere “awareness that the Government may be watching chills as-
sociational and expressive freedoms”65. On 14 March 2013, the District Court for the 
Northern District of California in In re National Security Letter concluded that “the 
nondisclosure provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (c) violates the First Amendment and 
18 U.S.C. § 3511 (b) (2) and (b) (3) violate the First Amendment and separation of 
powers principles. The Government is therefore enjoined from issuing NSLs under 
§ 2709 or from enforcing the nondisclosure provision in this or any other case”.66
As a result, in June 2015, Congress passed the USA Freedom Act that gave 
the recipient of an NSL the right to file a petition for judicial review of a nondis-
closure order. Under that novel law, a recipient could notify the FBI of the desire 
to challenge the nondisclosure order, and by doing that the FBI would be bound 
to apply for an order prohibiting “disclosure of the existence or contents” of the 
relevant NSL. Under that Act, the US Attorney General was obliged to develop 
novel procedures that permit the examination of each issued confidentiality clause 
61 D.J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, “New York University Law Re-
view” 2007, vol. 82, p. 167.
62 Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
63 Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
64 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
65 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012).
66 In re National Security Letter 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
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to ascertain whether the material that has been collected justifies secrecy.67 On 
15 March 2020, Section 215 of the Patriot Act, an emergency provision expanding 
surveillance to an unprecedented level, was to expire. A week before the expiration 
date the House of the Representatives passed the USA Freedom Reauthorization 
Act of 2020,68 but in a political twist Senator Mitch McConnell, Senate majority 
leader, brought the bill to the floor (thereby extending the expiration date for an-
other 77 days).69 The reason was obvious; a debate in the Senate was needed for 
the bill to pass. The lack of time and lack of certainty of support made McCon-
nell’s decision the only option. And finally, on 14 May 2020, the Senate passed 
the bill with substantial support (80–16). The Senate, however, added a significant 
amendment to the bill by adding Section 901 to the title, focusing on “limitations 
on authorities to surveil United States persons and on the use of information con-
cerning United States persons”.70
An examination of the issue of National Security Letters in post-9/11 America 
leads to four key observations. First, it is important to note that a firm response 
such as the Patriot Act of 2001 was expected not only in the USA. Alexandra 
Gheciu observes, in her analysis of security narratives in the 21st century, that “In 
the post-9/11 world, in a situation marked by the rise to prominence of a new type 
of enemy, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have all faced the pressure to adapt to 
changing notions of security. They have had to reposition themselves along the 
liberty/security spectrum to be able to devise new combinations of normal liberal 
practices/exceptions to those practices in an effort to enhance the capacity to combat 
that new type of enemy”.71
Second, in times of trouble, the nation expresses unity in understanding that 
sometimes security is more important than liberty. Just after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks the president, Congress, the general public, and even the judicial branch, 
were eager to accept massive surveillance.
Third, the case of National Security Letters and the extensive use of various 
methods of surveillance and information gathering proves that it does not take 
much time to pass emergency laws and limit individual liberties for the sake of 
security, but it takes a substantial amount of time to restore the balance between 
liberty and security.
Fourth, the experience of the United States proves that in the long term the 
only way to secure individual liberties is a well-informed and independent ju-
67 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline 
Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23, 129 Stat. 269.
68 USA Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2020, H.R.6172 – 116th Congress.
69 166 Cong. Rec. 2441 (2020).
70 166 Cong. Rec. 2439 (2020).
71 A. Gheciu, Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and OSCE in the Post-9/11 World, Oxford 
2008, p. 28.
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dicial branch. The limitations imposed on the government in using surveillance 
techniques, even those adopted by Congress, most often were the results of court 
rulings that defended freedoms granted by the Constitution.
The situation of the USA that has been discussed above shows that withdrawal 
by authorities from “temporary” regulations that negatively affect the realization of 
civil rights and freedoms can encounter difficulties even in a country that is a “flag-
ship” example of a democratic state ruled by law and in which society is committed 
to constitutional values. That is a bad omen for Poland which is a country where 
democracy does not have as long a history as it does in the USA. The mere manner 
of how formally solutions were introduced in Poland to counteract the COVID-19 
pandemic and its consequences it is already worrying. Namely, the Polish authorities 
decided not to resort to the, seemingly, most obvious implements in law which are 
declaring one of the states of emergency that are provided in the Constitution, or 
implementing solutions under one of the laws adopted long ago regulating states 
of emergency (primarily a declaration of a state of natural disaster). The structure 
of states of emergency should be interpreted under constitutional axiology and 
the pragmatics of the actions of authorized entities to restore the normal mode of 
functioning of a state as soon as possible.72 Meanwhile, the law to counteract the 
COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences was adopted in the form of so-termed 
“special law” which under the typology of Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin 
can be categorized to be factual (non-constitutional) solutions.73
Of course, the Polish system of sources of law defined by the binding Constitu-
tion does not provide for the concept of a “special law”. Therefore, it is not a concept 
within the notion of the language of the law. However, it is used in practicing the 
law (it is used by the judicature, in legal doctrine, and by the media as an expression 
of colloquial language). In the Third Polish Republic, the formulation was used for 
the first time when passing the Act of 10 April 2003 on special rules for preparing 
and implementing investments in public roads.74 To this day, such solutions are 
more and more often used in Polish legislative practice. The peculiarity of them is 
emphasized, which can be considered on many levels. The distinctiveness of them 
relates to many aspects (objective and subjective). Acts of that type should meet 
specific doctrinally defined criteria:
− the subject of regulation should relate to a segment of matters in a specific 
area,
− the provisions of the act are a lex specialis in relation to those already in 
force,
72 K. Dobrzeniecki, op. cit.
73 O. Gross, F. Ní Aoláin, op. cit.
74 Journal of Laws 2003, no. 80, item 721.
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− be episodic in nature (although there are also some with no specified term 
of validity),
− the axiological justification for adopting them (and, therefore, for legalization 
of them) is an important national matter or in the public interest.75
A comparison of the premises and features of extraordinary measures to those 
attributed to special laws in the literature on the subject lead to the conclusion that 
they are very similar. Through this act, the legislator intends to achieve the under-
lying goal by using quicker and easier means. Applying standard statutory rules in 
a given area would have meant that legislative barriers would have prevented so 
quick an implementation. It happens to be, therefore, that the “special law” is, i.a., 
a form of avoiding the unequivocal establishment of states of emergency. Such an 
instrumental approach to achieving the intended goals, with the limitation of human 
and civil rights, could lead to the end of the liberal and democratic state. History 
shows that it is relatively easy to extend a state of emergency and the state specified 
in a “special law”, which may even lead to the end of a nation altogether.76 This type 
of phenomenon leads to paradoxes in emergency situations an example of which 
is the current pandemic and the fight against it through subsequent special law.
Various justifications were officially given for not declaring in Poland a state of 
natural disaster, but that was probably determined in the context of the forthcoming 
presidential elections in Poland. The constitutional regulation is that during a state 
of emergency the provisions of the Constitution, Electoral Law, and Acts on ex-
traordinary measures, cannot be changed, and the elections planned for that period 
are to be held on strictly defined later dates (Article 228 (6) and (7) of the Polish 
Constitution).77 Under the Constitution, general elections cannot be held during 
a state of emergency, or within 90 days after it ends. The public opinion polls in 
spring 2020 indicated that it would have been unfavourable for the ruling coalition 
of the United Right in Poland and Andrzej Duda the President of the Republic of 
Poland who had been in office since 2015, and who is associated with the coalition. 
Therefore, the electoral rules were changed by means of a “special law” (in the 
first version, these were only to be elections by correspondence, but which did not 
eventuate; the next version permitted direct elections, in addition to elections by 
correspondence). Ultimately, the actions of the ruling coalition proved effective and 
at the end of June, beginning of July 2020, Andrzej Duda was re-elected, although 
the lead over the opponent happened to be minimal.
75 Ł. Zaliwski, „Specustawy” w prawodawstwie polskim – zjawisko incydentalne czy stałe?, 
“Zeszyty Naukowe PWSZ im. Witelona w Legnicy” 2018, vol. 27(2), pp. 133–151.
76 N.C. Lazar, State of Emergency in Liberal Democracies, Cambridge 2009, p. 2.
77 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, ed. P. Tuleja, Warszawa 2019; Konstytucja 
RP, vol. 2: Komentarz do art. 87–243, ed. M. Safjan, Warszawa 2016.
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The “special laws” have been and still are a threat to the rule of law because 
they concentrate authority in the executive and disrupt legislative and judicial 
activities. Under the provisions of the COVID-19 special law, restrictions limiting 
human and civil rights can be extended. A preliminary assessment of that approach 
by the legislator, already, at this point, raises major doubt under the principle of 
the rule of law as to the legality of the introduced legislation. All this puts human 
and civil rights at risk. In Poland, this was reflected, for example, in disrupting 
proper conduct of the presidential elections. They even led to the disclosure of 
documents evidencing corruption (the purchase of respirators and protective masks 
from unverified suppliers under the provisions of the “special law”). That weakened 
the readiness and capacity of the national health service to manage the pandemic.
CONCLUSIONS
The comparative analysis presented in this paper demonstrates how legislation 
operates and adapts to great emergency situations. The spread of COVID-19 un-
doubtedly affects the form of the rule of law. It creates an opportunity to concentrate 
authority in the executive and causes disruption in parliamentary activities, and 
disruption in the activities of courts and the organization of elections. The measures 
that are being applied to deal with the pandemic crisis could endanger fundamental 
rights and civil liberties. They can lead to social discrimination and the disruption 
of economic processes, education, and general security. It is worth noting that at 
a time of a common threat citizens are ready to voluntarily resign from enforcing 
the rights and freedoms that they have, and perceive being rescued from trouble 
by a “strong-arm” government. Indeed, it might seem that the epidemic should be 
dealt with efficiently by authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian systems. However, 
it is necessary to consider exceptions to that regularity. That is because in some 
authoritarian countries those in authority could ignore the existence of an actual 
epidemiological threat and minimize it, or even ignore it altogether (see the example 
of Belarus). The authorities in authoritarian countries in fearing an economic crisis 
that could be caused by the limitations of an anti-pandemic policy could order the 
continuation of a normal lifestyle. Therefore, while authoritarian countries could, 
formally, have a greater possibility to implement radical restrictions, a negative 
side effect could be ignoring an actual epidemiological threat. That also applies to 
those democratic countries in which the degree of transparency and the rule of law 
is lower, such as it is in Poland. That is a generalization that illustrates that mod-
ern forms of democracy cannot cope with such an unusual situation. Democratic 
systems will have the necessity of solving difficult problems of coexistence and 
cooperation in conditions of pluralism, and the constant confrontation of different 
values arising from different cultures. The pandemic means that it could seem that 




The COVID-19 Pandemic as an Opportunity for a Permanent Reduction in Civil Rights 105
a future form of democracy should be less permissive (tolerant) and depart from 
the equality of different positions (pluralism). In democratic countries entities such 
as parliaments, courts, and similar decision-making bodies that participate in the 
process of solving problems and conflicts brought about by today’s reality must, 
however, be open to cooperation, compromise, and concession. Undoubtedly, that 
is a tenuous instrument because procedural democracy (appropriate for a liberal 
society in a postmodern era) does not have numerous sanctions, but is based on 
mutual tolerance and good will of the participating subjects. It is worth mentioning 
here that one of the components of the criticism of the optimism of Enlightenment, 
which based on the concept of democracy, human rights, individual freedom, and 
trust in the wisdom and effectiveness of human reason, was the conviction that that 
optimism is a relatively effective solution only in times of peace and prosperity in 
appropriately wealthy societies. In exceptional and extraordinary situations such 
as conflicts, social unrest, or crises, optimism fails. It is reasonable in that situation 
to state that freedom means being able to choose, but at the same time it intimates 
bearing consequences for decisions that are made. Undoubtedly, too broad an 
understanding of equality and freedom is very dangerous; it opens the way for 
populist politicians that have authoritarian temptations.78
The authors’ goal was to show some regularities, not to give proposals on how 
to better manage such emergency situations. The experiences of the USA and Po-
land that have been described above remind us that civil rights and freedoms are 
not given “once and for all”. It should not be forgotten that the law is not only an 
instrument of extending the rights of individuals, civil liberties and social rights. 
The law can also be a very effective instrument for reducing those rights and direct-
ing society onto a path of building authoritarianism, and situations of widespread 
danger such as is the COVID-19 pandemic or terrorist threat can favour achieving 
advantage by legislative solutions that serve to achieve such goals.
REFERENCES
Literature
Ackerman B., Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, New Haven 
2006.
Alexander L.A., Constitutionalism, [in:] The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory, eds. M.P. Golding, W.A. Edmundson, Oxford 2008.
Alexy R., La doble naturaleza del derecho, Madrid 2016.
Barbera A., Le basi filosofiche del costituzionalismo, Bari–Roma 2019.
78 N. Lacey, Populism and the Rule of Law, “Annual Review of Law and Social Science” 2019, 
vol. 15, pp. 79–96.




106 P. Chmielnicki, D. Minich, R. Rybkowski, M. Stachura, K. Szocik
Bauman Z., Liquid Modernity, Cambridge 2000.
Bingham T, The Rule of Law, London 2011.
Bloch-Wehba H., Process Without Procedure: National Security Letters and First Amendment Rights, 
“Suffolk University Law Review” 2016, vol. 39(3).
Chemerinsky E., Post 9/11 Civil Rights: Are Americans Sacrificing Freedom for Security?, “Denver 
University Law Review” 2004, vol. 81(4).
Chmielnicki P., Dybała A., Stachura M., Activity Rules of Economic Man in Society as the Source of 
Legal Norms, Warsaw 2010.
Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, ed. L.A. Alexander, Cambridge 2001.
Devins N., Fisher L., The Democratic Constitution, Oxford 2004.
Dippel H., Modern Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a History in the Need of Writing, “Legal 
History Review” 2005, vol. 73.
Dobrzeniecki K., Prawo wobec sytuacji nadzwyczajnej. Między legalizmem a koniecznością, Toruń 
2018.
Dyzenhaus D., The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency, Cambridge 2009.
Elliot J., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 
vol. 4: Virginia Resolutions of 1798, Washington 1836.
Fromm E., Escape from Freedom, New York 2013.
Fuller L.L., The Morality of Law, New Haven–London 1969.
Gheciu A., Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and OSCE in the Post-9/11 World, Oxford 2008, 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217229.001.0001.
Gross O., “Once more unto the Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, “Yale Journal of International Law” 1998, 
vol. 23(2).
Gross O., Ni Aoláin F., Law in Times of Crisis, Cambridge 2006, 
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493997.
Hart H.L.A, The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961.
Heller Á., Wykłady i seminaria lubelskie, Lublin 2006.
Konstytucja RP, vol. 2: Komentarz do art. 87–243, ed. M. Safjan, Warszawa 2016.
Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, ed. P. Tuleja, Warszawa 2019.
Krygier M., Four Puzzles about the Rule of Law: Why, what, where? And who cares?, “Sant’Anna 
Legal Studies” 2015, vol. 5.
Lacey N., Populism and the Rule of Law, “Annual Review of Law and Social Science” 2019, vol. 15, 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-101518-042919.
Laidler P., How Republicans and Democrats Strengthen Secret Surveillance in the United States, 
“Political Preferences” 2019, vol. 25, DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/polpre.2019.25.5-20.
Lazar N.C., State of Emergency in Liberal Democracies, Cambridge 2009, 
 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596704.
Likert R., A technique for the measurement of attitudes, “Archives of Psychology” 1932, vol. 140.
Magnusson R., Chapter 11: Public Health Emergencies, [in:] Advancing the Right to Health: The 
Vital Role of Law, Geneva 2017.
Nieland A.E., National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, “Cornell Law Review” 2007, 
vol. 92(6).
Palombella G., The Rule of Law as Institutional Ideal, “Comparative Sociology” 2010, vol. 9(1), 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/156913210X12535202814315.
Pino G., Il costituzionalismo dei diritti. Struttura e limiti del costituzionalismo contemporaneo, 
Bologna 2017.
Radbruch G., Gesetzliches. Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, “Süddeutsche Juristen-Zaitung” 
1946, vol. 1.




The COVID-19 Pandemic as an Opportunity for a Permanent Reduction in Civil Rights 107
Rybkowski R., Dyskurs strachu. Jak się nie bać współczesnych mediów?, “Horyzonty Wychowania” 
2011, vol. 10(19).
Salam R., The Relationship Between States of Emergency, Politics and The Rule of Law, “Canterbury 
Law Review” 2017, vol. 23.
Solove D.J., The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, “New York University Law Review” 
2007, vol. 82.
The Paradox of Constitutionalism. Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, eds. M. Loughlin, 
N. Walker, Oxford 2007.
Weinstein B., Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters, “Washington 
University Journal of Law & Policy” 2015, vol. 47.
Wyden R., Guthrie C., Dickas J., Perkins A., Law and Policy Efforts to Balance Security, Privacy and 
Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 America, “Stanford Law and Policy Review” 2006, vol. 17(329).
Zaliwski Ł., „Specustawy” w prawodawstwie polskim – zjawisko incydentalne czy stałe?, “Zeszyty 
Naukowe PWSZ im. Witelona w Legnicy” 2018, vol. 27(2).
Zitter J.M., Annotation, Constitutionality of National Security Letters Issued Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2709, (2008), 25 A.L.R. FED. 2d 547.
Online sources
Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/text/20010920-8.html [access: 6.03.2021].
Foucault M., Benvenuto S., Agamben G., Coronavirus and Philosophers, “European Journal of 
Psychoanalysis” 2020, www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/coronavirus-and-philosophers [access: 
6.03.2021].
Government bill on interest subsidies for bank loans to provide financial liquidity to business affected 
by COVID-19 and on amendments to certain other acts (Print no. 382 and 382-A), 2020, www.
sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=382 [access: 6.03.2021].
Johns Hopkins University & Medicine. Coronavirus Resource Center, COVID-19 Dashboard by 
the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University, https://
coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html [access: 2.06.2021].
Leigh Cowan A., Hartford Libraries Watch as U.S. Makes Demands, 2.09.2005, www.nytimes.
com/2005/09/02/nyregion/hartford-libraries-watch-as-us-makes-demands.html [access: 6.03.2021].
Pandemic severity index, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pandemic_severity_index [access: 6.03.2021].
Statement of MP Katarzyna Lubnauer, record of the session of the Health Committee of the Sejm 
of the Republic of Poland (no. 13) of 2 March 2020, www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/biuletyn.
xsp?skrnr=ZDR-13 [access: 6.03.2021].
Svensson S., Disinformation kills: The Covid-19 infodemic, 29.04.2020, https://observatoryihr.org/
blog/disinformation-kills-the-covid-19-infodemic [access: 6.03.2021].
United Nations Department of Global Communications, UN working to ensure vulnerable groups 
not left behind in COVID-19 response, www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/
un-working-ensure-vulnerable-groups-not-left-behind-covid-19 [access: 6.03.2021].
Others
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act, Serial no. 39, 2001, Washington 2001.
Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis, and Interpretation – Centennial Edition – 
Interim, S. Doc. 112-9, August 26, 2017.
House of Representatives Report 95-1383 (1986).
In re National Security Letter 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2013).




108 P. Chmielnicki, D. Minich, R. Rybkowski, M. Stachura, K. Szocik
Legal acts
Act of 10 April 2003 on specific rules for preparing and implementing investment in public roads 
(Journal of Laws 2003, no. 80, item 721).
Act of 2 March 2020 on specific solutions related to the prevention, countering, and combating COV-
ID-19, other infectious diseases, and crises caused by them (Journal of Laws 2020, item 374).
Act of 31 March 2020 amending the Act on the system of development of institutions (Journal of 
Laws 2020, item 569).
Act of 6 April 2020 on specific rules for holding general elections for the presidency of the Republic 
of Poland that were scheduled for 2020 (Journal of Laws 2020, item 827).
Act of 19 June 2020 on interest subsidies on bank loans granted to business persons affected by 
COVID-19, and on simplification of proceedings to approve an arrangement because of the 
occurrence of COVID-19 (Journal of Laws 2020, item 1086).
Alien Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, no. 78, item 483, as 
amended).
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641.
Smith Act of 1940, Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over 
Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23, 129 Stat. 269.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
USA Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2020, H.R.6172 – 116th Congress.
USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Publ. L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192.
Case law
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005).
Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012).
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
ABSTRAKT
Pandemia COVID-19 wywołała daleko idące skutki, które są widoczne przede wszystkim w funk-
cjonowaniu służby zdrowia, organizacji życia społecznego i stanie gospodarki narodowej. Warto 
zwrócić uwagę także na konsekwencje prawne i polityczne, które są mniej oczywiste i odczuwalne 
dla przeciętnych obywateli. Jedną z najważniejszych jest zmiana ustawodawstwa, która pociąga za 
sobą ograniczenie wolności i praw obywatelskich. Niniejszy artykuł jest empirycznym dowodem 
na to, jak polskie ustawodawstwo ogranicza prawa podstawowe. Władze w walce z pandemią nie 
korzystają z rozwiązań, które znajdują się w Konstytucji RP, lecz sięgają po pozakonstytucyjną formę 
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tzw. specustaw. Omawiając to zagadnienie, autorzy odwołują się do amerykańskiego ustawodawstwa 
i polityki, gdzie znamiennym przykładem jest Patriot Act, który można interpretować jako pretekst 
do ograniczania swobód obywatelskich w imię walki z terroryzmem. Jak stwierdzono, takie sytuacje 
nadzwyczajne jak obecna pandemia czy zagrożenie terroryzmem są wykorzystywane do trwałego 
i znaczącego ograniczania praw obywatelskich.
Słowa kluczowe: pandemia COVID-19; prawa podstawowe; wolności obywatelskie; prawa oby-
watelskie; amerykańskie ustawodawstwo ; polskie ustawodawstwo
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